I. INTRODUCTION
The developing world -and some of the developed world too -is in the midst of a major push toward universal health coverage (cf. World Health Organization 2010). Since everyone in almost every country has some coverage through the partially tax-financed network of public facilities that are accessible by everyone, the agenda in practice is about reducing the gap in de facto coverage between the section of the population relying on public facilities and the sections of the population covered by more generous and more explicit coverage schemes. The latter group typically includes civil servants who receive health coverage at the taxpayer's expense as a perk of their job, and formal-sector workers, many (if not most or all) of whom are required to enroll in a contributory scheme with contributions linked to earnings, split between the employee and employer, and supplemented by subsidies from tax-payers. While the details of the arrangements vary from country to country, a common emerging pattern is for governments to use general revenues to provide more generous -and sometimes more explicit -coverage to at least some individuals not covered by schemes for civil servants and formal-sector workers and their dependents. In some countries this has involved setting up a third scheme (Mexico and Thailand are examples 1 ), while in others the hitherto "uncovered" individuals are brought into an existing scheme (Vietnam is an example 2 ). In some cases, everyone without formal coverage is included in the new program at no cost to the individual (Thailand is an example); in others only some are given the full subsidy, and the rest are expected to contribute at least part of the cost (this is the case in Mexico and Vietnam).
The goal of these initiatives, of course, is to narrow gaps in coverage and hence improve people's health and their protection against the financial consequences of ill health. But the question arises as to whether these well-intentioned initiatives may have unintended negative side-effects. If they do, one would want to know how large they are relative to the benefits of the policies, and whether these benefits could be achieved at lower cost through some alternative policy. Levy (2008) has argued that one unintended consequence of such policies is that they provide people with an incentive to work in the informal sector rather than the formal sector, since people can obtain similar if not identical health coverage without making any additional specific health contribution. (They have to non-payroll pay taxes, of course, but they have to do this anyway.) Inadvertently therefore universal health coverage may skew employment and investment away from the formal sector, and -according to Levy -reduce economic growth. This informalization of the labor force may also leave workers with less protection against the income losses associated with health shocks if the universal coverage program covers health care costs but not sickness absence, disability benefits, and so on. It may also leave them with less protection against the financial consequences of non-health shocks (e.g. unemployment, and old age) insofar as the various social insurance programs are bundled together.
Mexico -where Levy served as deputy finance minister -is the country where this issue has been researched and debated the most, although there has been some work undertaken in other Latin American countries (see Aterido et al. (2011) for a review) and in Europe and central Asia (Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra 2009) . Aterido et al. (2011) provide a review of the Mexican literature and other Latin American studies. They also provide a new set of estimates for Mexico whose Seguro Popular (SP) or People's Insurance provides explicit health coverage to the majority (55%) of the Mexican population not covered by the formal-sector health insurance program (the latter covers dependents as well as workers) (see e.g. King 2007; King et al. 2009 ). SP was launched in 2001 as a pilot program and was subsequently rolled out across the country over a period of several years; only in 2012 does the government expect to achieve 100 percent coverage of households not covered by the formal-sector or social security program. The staggered rollout of SP provides a credible way of identifying the impacts of the program on informality. Studies to date have found some effect, but the magnitude is very small. The study by Aterido et al. is the most recent and arguably the most credible, not least because it uses the longest time period, and exploits the panel nature of the data to eliminate individual-or householdspecific effects. Aterido et al. find that SP reduced the probability of being in the formal sector by just half of one percent.
In this paper we explore the labor impacts of another universal health coverage program, namely the Thai Universal Coverage (UC) or 30-Baht scheme (cf. e.g. Pannarunothai et al. 2004) . Like Seguro Popular, Thailand's UC scheme has become one of the world's most discussed universal coverage initiatives: the two reforms have in effect become the poster children of universal coverage reforms, with the architects of the systems engaging in extensive international public relations exercises to promote their reform model. The Thai reform is an especially interesting one from a labor market perspective. The Thai UC scheme differs from Seguro Popular in three respects, all of which are likely to make for larger informality effects. First, there are minimal copayments and no joining fee in Thailand's UC scheme -everyone is covered automatically with a 100 percent subsidy. By contrast, in Seguro Popular households with the means to pay are supposed to contribute, so opting out of the formal sector scheme does not eliminate contributions. 3 Second, the relative generosity of the two schemes differs. Both are less generous than the social security scheme, but the gap is wider in Mexico: in 2000, spending per enrollee in Seguro Popular was just 66 percent that of the social security program; by contrast, on a per-beneficiary basis Thailand's UC scheme spends 85 percent of the amount spent by the social security scheme. 4, 5 Third, the two countries' social security schemes treat dependents differently: Mexico's covers dependents while Thailand's does not. Thus in Mexico once one household member is in the formal sector, there is no incentive -from a health coverage perspective -for additional members to seek a formal-sector job. In Thailand, by contrast, at least prior to the UC reform, the health coverage rules gave each household member an incentive to seek a formal-sector job. Health coverage rules prior to the reform thus created an incentive for Mexican households to limit the number of formalsector workers to one, but for Thai households to keep adding formal-sector workers. The informalizing effect of the Thai reform ought therefore to have been greater -a larger fraction of workers will have been encouraged to formalize prior to the reform, but discouraged from formalizing after the reform.
We use an informal expected-utility framework that captures the risk of medical care expenses associated with informal employment prior to UC to explore the possible effects of the UC reform: we conclude that UC could cause unmarried individuals to prefer the informal sector over the formal sector, and may cause a married couple to favour having both of them working in the informal sector in preference to having the husband work in the formal sector and the wife not working. We explore empirically the impacts of the UC scheme on the probabilities of working, working in the informal sector, and working in the informal sector. Our identification strategy comes from the staggered rollout of the individual's labor market status at a particular date to their length of exposure to the UC "regime", which will depend on the survey date and the person's province of residence. Our statistical power comes from the fact that we have an average of 62,000 respondents at each survey date, and 68 survey dates most of which are just one month apart. The accuracy of our estimates is enhanced by the fact that 17 of the 68 surveys we use predate the launch of UC: this allows us our regressions to capture the pre-reform trends in our labor market outcomes. We control for the potentially confounding effects of the Thai Village Fund that was also rolled out from 2001 onwards.
We find that UC appears to have encouraged employment especially among married women, to have reduced formal-sector employment among married men but not among other groups, and to have increased informal-sector employment especially among married women. We see the largest positive informal-sector employment effects in the agricultural sector. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that by eliminating the medical expenditure risks associated with informal-sector employment, UC has encouraged couples to work in the informal sector in a rural setting rather than live in the city and rely on earnings from a single breadwinner's formal-sector job. Our results suggest that UC increased informal-sector employment overall by two percentage points in the year of UC adoption rising to just under 10 percentage points after three years. This effect is, as expected, larger than that found for Seguro Popular. We end with some thoughts on the policy implications.
II. THAILAND'S UNIVERSAL COVERAGE SCHEME
Before the introduction of Universal Coverage (UC) in 2001, Thais were either not covered for their health care expenses (more than 25 percent of the population fell into this category) or were covered by one or more of the schemes operating at the time: see Hanvoravongchai and Hsiao (2007) and Table 1 . The largest of the pre-UC schemes was the Medical Welfare Scheme (WHS) which provided tax-financed cover for various poor and vulnerable groups, including the poor, the elderly, children below the age of 12, secondary school students, the disabled, war veterans, and monks. These groups comprised around 33 percent of the population. The next largest scheme was the Health Card Scheme (HCS) -a public voluntary insurance program for nonpoor households who were ineligible for the WHS. This accounted for around 12 percent of the population. The third largest scheme was the Civil Servants Medical Benefits Scheme (CSMBS) in which health insurance was provided as a fringe benefit to current and retired civil servants and their dependents. This scheme covered around 11 percent of the population in 2000. The final scheme was the Social Security Scheme (SSS). This scheme aimed to cover employees of establishments with more than 10 workers, but not their dependents, and was -and still is -financed through a payroll tax (1.5 percent paid by the employer, 1.5 percent paid by the employee) and a subsidy (the government also pays 1.5 percent). Around 10 percent of the population was covered through this scheme in 2000. Outlays per enrollee varied considerably across the schemes: the CSMBS recorded the highest at Baht 2,106; the SSS recorded the second highest at Baht 1,558; and the HC and MWS recorded much lower outlays per enrollee of just Baht 534 and Baht 363 respectively. 6 Frustrated with the low coverage of the HC scheme and with the resultant large number of Thais without coverage 7 , Thailand's government decided to introduce a UC scheme to cover people not covered by the SS and CSMBS schemes. The scheme was to be funded largely by general revenues, with a minimal copayment of 30 baht (about USD 0.75 at the time) fixed-fee per visit (hence the initial name -the Thirty Baht Scheme). Once it was rolled out, the UC scheme covered around 70 percent of the Thai population. Table 2 summarizes the main features of the UC scheme and compares it with the CSMBS and SSS schemes. The government budgeted as much as Baht 1,309 per enrollee in the UC scheme, a dramatic increase on the per-enrollee outlays of the HC and MWS schemes, and equal to 85 percent of the expenditure per enrollee in the SSS. On paper at least all three schemes provide comprehensive medical coverage to their members, and the UC and SS schemes are similar in terms of their coverage of maternity benefits (both cover them), annual physical checkup (neither does), and prevention and promotion (both cover health education and immunization). UC and SS enrollees are similarly restricted in their choice of provider, being required to choose a contracted hospital or its network; the contracted providers differ, however, between the two schemes. In both schemes, registration with a regular provider is required, and enrollees in both schemes have access to both public and private providers, though in practice most UC contracted providers have been Ministry of Public Health hospitals. One difference between the UC and SS schemes is that the latter but not the former provides certain cash benefits payable in the event of sickness, disability and death.
The UC scheme was rolled out in four phases. 
III. HYPOTHESIZED LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL COVERAGE
We explore in this section the possible labor supply effects of UC using a simple expected utility framework. We argue that UC could cause unmarried individuals to prefer the informal sector over the formal sector, and may cause a married couple to prefer both working in the informal sector to having the husband working in the formal sector and the wife not working.
Consider first the case of an unmarried individual. If the person works in the informal sector, they get an income II but face a risk p of incurring medical costs equal to M.
In the example in Figure 1 , it is assumed for simplicity that p=0.5. The expected utility associated with informal-sector employment is EUI in Figure 1 . After UC, the risk associated with medical care costs is eliminated, and the couple can attain U(II,I) with certainty by both working informally, which is what they decide to do. This example illustrates that by eliminating the risk of medical care expenses UC may cause a couple to prefer to have both working in the informal sector rather than having the husband in the formal sector and the wife not working.
There is one factor that will likely limit -but not eliminate -the reduction in the incentive to be in the formal sector versus the other two labor market states, namely that the social security scheme likely provides greater access to private providers (cf. Table 2), which is likely to be considered a plus.
IV. METHODS
While a national program, UC was phased in, as explained above, over a period of nine months, with one set of provinces implementing the policy in April 2001, a second set two months later, a third set four months later, and the final set three months afterwards.
We use this staggered rollout to identify the impacts of UC. From January 2002 (the date the fourth and last wave of provinces implemented UC), we have an exposure difference of nine months between the first-wave provinces and the last-wave provinces. Assuming the effects of UC were similar across provinces, we should see changes appearing first in the first-wave provinces, the next set of changes two months later in the second-wave provinces, and so on. In other words, we can estimate the impacts of UC by linking labor market outcomes of individual i at time t to the amount of time individual i has been exposed to the UC "regime" at time t. Exposure will vary depending on when the survey was done, but also on which of the four groups of provinces the person lives in. Clustering at the provincial level will, of course, be an issue from the point of view of statistical power.
However, with a very large number of respondents at each survey date (62,000 on average), and a very large number of survey dates (68, of which a majority -51 -are after the start of the rollout of UC and a month apart), we should have sufficient statistical power to detect any effect that increased exposure to the UC "regime" has on our outcomes of interest.
When linking labor market outcomes to exposure to UC, we need to be careful to control for variables that may be correlated with UC rollout. Household-and individuallevel variables are unlikely to cause omitted variable bias; however, their inclusion does help to improve precision (cf. e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2009, p.237) so we include the obvious individual-and household-level covariates. Rather, our concern with omitted variable bias lies with events and/or programs that may have also had labor market effects and whose timing in a specific location coincides with the introduction of UC. The confounder we are most worried about is the Village Fund (VF) program, which was also launched in 2001 and whose rollout could conceivably have coincided -at least in some areas -with the rollout of UC. The VF aimed to stimulate local economies by providing to every village and urban community one million baht (around $22,500) in seed money for a locally-run micro-credit association (cf. Boonperm et al. 2012) . Villagers could add this fund to their existing village's micro-credit institution, or if the village did not have one at the time, the money could be used to set one up. According to the socio-economic survey collected by the Thai national statistical office in 2004, 50 percent of VF borrowers used the loan to fund agricultural activities, 30 percent used the loan to fund daily expenses, while 14 percent used the loan to fund non-farm business (Boonperm et al. 2012) . Given this, we expect that the VF may have had a positive impact on the number of informal andto a lesser extent -formal jobs. We discuss below how we try to capture the effects of the VF in our estimations so that our UC impact estimates are not biased.
Let yipt be our outcome of interest for individual i in province p at quarter t. Our estimating equation takes the form:
where Xipt is a vector of covariates at the household-and individual-level, the are a series of dummies capturing the UC and VF policies defined in a way that we explain below, p and t are province-and period-specific effects (each quarter is allowed its own fixed effect), and eit is an error capturing unobservable variables and noise. Our interest is in the   which capture the effect of UC (we discuss their interpretation below). In our estimation of eqn (1) We also estimate a version of eqn (1) with constraints imposed on the   similar to the constraints imposed by Bosch and Campos-Vázquez (2010) in their analysis of Mexico's Seguro Popular. We constrain the   and the   in each quarter to be the equal to one another, giving UC and VF variables that capture years (rather than quarters) to or since UC and VF implementation. Like Bosch and Campos-Vázquez, we constrain the   and the   to be the same for 3+ years before UC/VF implementation and for 3+ years after UC/VF implementation.
Bearing in mind that we omit the UC dummy for the period prior to UC implementation, and that we have quarterly data prior to UC and monthly data thereafter, the constrained version of eqn
(1) includes six dummies: the first equalling one when the quarter is three or more years before implementation (UC -3 ); the second equalling one when the quarter is two years before UC implementation (UC -2 ); the third equalling one when the month is between zero and 12 months after implementation (UC 0 ); the fourth equalling one when the month is between 12 and 24 months of implementation (UC 1 ); the fifth equalling one when the month is between 24 and 36 months of implementation (UC 2 ); and the sixth equalling one when the month is 36 months or more after implementation (UC 3 ). If UC has a causal effect on y, we would expect   and   to be zero, and at least some of   ,   ,   and   to be nonzero, depending on the time profile of UC impacts.
V. Our outcomes of interest are whether the individual is working, and if so whether they are in the formal sector or informal sector. LFS respondents are asked whether they worked during the previous week, and if not whether they received a salary or wage and whether they have a job to return to. If the individual was not working and had no job to return to, we classified them as not working. Respondents who said they were employed were asked about their type of employment, the categories being: (i) employer; (ii) selfemployed; (iii) unpaid family helper; (iv) government employee; (v) government enterprise employee; and (vi) private employee. We classified (i)-(iii) as informal sector, and (iv)-(v) as formal sector. As for (vi), the private employees, we classified those who earned monthly salary as formal and those who earned hourly or daily wage as informal.
Our UC "treatment" variable is constructed from the province of residence of the respondent, the timing of the UC implementation in the individual's province, and the date (month and year) of the LFS. We construct variables corresponding to the numbers of months, quarters, half years, and years since implementation of UC in the individual's province as of the LFS in question. From these we construct the dummy variables in eqn
(1).
Our VF variable is constructed from the province of residence of the respondent, the timing of the arrival of the first VF funds, and the date (month and year) of the LFS. We define the VF variable analogously to the UC variable so if, for example, the UC variable is defined as years from UC implementation, the VF variable is also be defined as years from VF implementation 10 . In practice, pinning down the date of VF implementation was not straightforward. We were able to obtain from the National Village and Urban Community
Fund Office the date that each village registered with the Thai government. However, we could not identify the date that each village actually received its 1-million baht fund. What we do know is that, on average, villages received their money within 2-3 months of registration. We therefore assume that the "implementation" date of VF is 3 months after the registration date. We define the VF variable at the provincial level because we do not know the identity of the village in our LFS data; we define the VF variable as the proportion Table 3, As for individual-specific covariates, we include gender, age and education. For the ease of analysis but without much loss of generality, we group age into 15-29 years old, 30-49 years old, 50-64 years old and over 64 years old. We also group education attainment based on the highest level of education achieved. The categories include: less than primary education; primary education; some secondary education; completed secondary education; vocational education; and university education and above.
VI. RESULTS
We focus in our presentation of our results on the impacts of UC. The signs of the coefficients of the non-UC variables in our regressions are broadly as expected. Education increases the likelihood of being in the formal sector, rural residents are less likely to be in the formal sector, and having school-age children reduces the likelihood of people being in the formal sector, as does having elderly household members. The Village Fund apparently increased the likelihood of working, but interestingly more in the formal sector than the informal sector. Table 4 reports the estimates of the impacts of UC on the probability of working, and the probabilities of being employed in the formal and informal sectors. The latter are not conditional on working, so in the case of formal-sector employment the other states are not employed and informally employed, while in the case of informal-sector employment the other states are not employed and formally employed. The coefficients are the estimates of the   in eqn (1) with the restrictions placed on the   as explained in section IV. The estimates show the "impact" of UC three and two years prior to its implementation (these coefficients ought not to be significantly different from zero), and the impacts of UC zero, one, two and three years after implementation. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the corresponding estimates and 95%
confidence intervals for the more flexible version of equation (1) where the   are unrestricted. In all cases, we control for the effects of the village fund, as well as the provincial minimum wage, educational attainment, age, the demographic mix of the respondent's household, area of residence (rural versus urban), and province and year.
There are some significant "effects" of UC prior to UC implementation which ought not to be evident if the effects we are estimating are causal relationships -unless they capture anticipatory effects. However, the number of significant prior "effects" in Table 4 is relatively few -just five out of 24 (20%). By contrast, there is a fairly high rate (just under 60%) of significant effects of UC after UC implementation, suggesting we can be reasonably confident we are estimating genuine causal effects. Table 4 and to a lesser extent Figure 3 suggest that UC increased employment, especially among married women. This is consistent with our hypothesized effects of UC in section IV, namely that UC offers married couples the possibility of returning from the city where only the man may work (due to limited job opportunities or limited childcare) to the countryside where informal employment is available without the risk of medical expenses, and childcare may be available through elderly parents (or less necessary because the home is also the place of employment). Despite the positive effect of UC on the probability of working, Table 4 suggests that UC reduced formal-sector employment, though only significantly so among men. The effect appears only with a lag, and is somewhat larger for married men. This gender-specific result and the larger effects among married men are also consistent with our hypothesized effects of UC in section IV. These effects are also apparent in the more general specification in Figure 4 . Finally, Table 4 suggests that UC had a positive effect on informal employment. The effect increases with the length of "exposure" to UC, beginning at around 1-3% in the year of implementation, and rising to 8-14% three years after implementation. These effects -which are also evident in Figure 5 -are evident for both men and women, and are statistically significant among all four groups two and three years after implementation, and statistically significant among three of the four groups one year after implementation. The effects on informal employment are most pronounced among married women -consistent with our hypothesized effects of UC prompting a return of families from the city to the countryside. Table 5 shows the effects of UC on form-and informal-sector employment for the sample as a whole. For the sample as a whole we find a negative but insignificant impact of UC on formal-sector employment, but a positive and significant impact of UC on informalsector employment starting at two percentage points in the year of implementation rising to 11 percentage points three years after. The formal and informal effects are not the mirror image of the other because the zero-coded category in each case includes not just the other category but also those not working. Also shown in Table 5 are the estimates of the effect of UC on formal-and informal-sector employment by sector. We see significant effects on formal-sector employment only in the case of the construction sector, and the reductions implied are very small. By contrast, we see sizeable significant positive impacts of UC on informal-sector employment, but only in the case of agriculture with an effect starting at three percentage points in the year of implementation rising to 14 percentage points after three years.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis exploits the phased rollout of the Thai Universal Coverage policy to estimate the labor market effects of the policy. We control for the effects of the Village Fund scheme which began to be rolled out around the same time; we are able to separate out the effects of the two programs through the spatial and temporal differences in program rollout. Our results point to labor market effects: UC appears to have encouraged employment especially among married women, to have reduced formal-sector employment at least among married men, and to have increased informal-sector employment especially among married women. We see the largest positive informal-sector employment effects in the agricultural sector. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that by eliminating the medical expenditure risks associated with informal-sector employment, UC has allowed couples to switch from a situation where the breadwinner works in an urban formal-sector job and the spouse co-locates but does not work to having both working in informal-sector jobs in a rural setting.
Our effects suggest that UC increased informal-sector employment by two percentage points initially rising to just under 10 percentage points after three years. This effect is larger than that found in recent work for Mexico's Seguro Popular universal health coverage reform -there the negative effects on formal-sector employment were around half of one percent. However, as indicated in the Introduction, there are some reasons to expect a larger effect in Thailand. The gap in the benefit package in Mexico means that in Figure 1 the individual still faces some risk in an informal sector job even after the SP reform. So while SP reduces M it does not reduce it to zero. U(II) is not attainable and the Mexican informal-sector worker has an expected utility after the reform that will exceed EUI but may fall short of UF. The fact that the Mexican informal-sector worker has to pay to join the SP scheme means that with insurance the individual's income in the state where illness does not occur is less than II; this further reduces the likelihood that the informalsector job -even after the SP reform -dominates the informal-sector job. Finally, as mentioned in the Introduction, the fact that social security provides health coverage to all household members in Mexico but only to the worker in Thailand means that Thai households had an incentive prior to the UC reform to get additional household members into formal-sector jobs, while in Mexico the incentive was to get just one household member into the formal sector. This made for a bigger pool of workers in Thailand who would be incentivized by the UC reform to switch out of the formal sector.
Thailand's UC scheme -like Mexico's Seguro Popular scheme -does appear to have encouraged growth in informal-sector employment, although the negative effects on the formal sector in Thailand appear to have been very small. Formal-sector employment is not, of course, an end its own right, but nonetheless having a health insurance program that biases employment growth toward the informal sector may well be considered unattractive. Several policy options suggest themselves. Some of these are likely to be considered unacceptable to Thai policymakers. One such option would be to deliberately encourage a per-capita funding gap between the UC scheme and the SS scheme, so that relying on the UC scheme has a "price" associated with it, in the form of a less generous benefit package. Another option would be to levy a contribution on UC enrollment, perhaps linked to the household's living standards through a "proxy means" test. This is also unlikely to be considered unacceptable by the Thai government, and evidence from Mexico
suggests that collecting means-tested contributions is expensive and hard to enforce.
Successful enforcement might deter the very people the government is seeking to cover from enrolling. A more palatable option would be to merge the two schemes at some point in time and delink the payroll tax from health care entitlements, either by scaling back the payroll tax so it raises just enough to finance the occupational pension, or by treating what is currently the health part of the payroll tax as just a tax on labor that helps to fund government programs. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are from estimates of eqn (1) with the coefficients on UC and VF constrained as described in section IV. The regressions include -in addition to the UC dummies -the VF dummies, province-and quarter-specific fixed effects, as well as as the provincial minimum wage, educational attainment, age, the demographic mix of the respondent's household, area of residence (rural versus urban). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the province level. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are from estimates of eqn (1) with the coefficients on UC and VF constrained as described in section IV. The regressions include -in addition to the UC dummies -the VF dummies, province-and quarter-specific fixed effects, as well as as the provincial minimum wage, educational attainment, age, the demographic mix of the respondent's household, area of residence (rural versus urban). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the province level. 
